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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF "FAIR USE" IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
Harry N. Rosenfield*
MR. BORK [Solicitor General]: . . . fair use, after all, is basically a con-
stitutional doctrine....
QUESTION [MR. JUSTICE RtHNQUIST]: Are you suggesting that
Congress would be constitutionally obligated to incorporate a doctrine of
fair use into the copyright law?
MR. BORK: That is debatable. I have seen it debated both ways, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist....
QUESTION: I thought you said a moment ago that fair use is constitu-
tionally-
MR. BORK: The courts have derived their power to evolve a doctrine of
fair use from the constitutional value, the constitutional principle. Whether
or not the court could second-guess Congress' decision about what would
promote, rather than retard, I don't know. Certainly that's not involved in
this case.'
This article will attempt an affirmative and more precise answer to Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's question: Fair use has a constitutional dimension which must
be protected by both the Congress and the courts.
I. Introduction
The Copyright Act grants authors what appears to be exclusive rights2 and
provides remedies for infringements of those rights.' However, the courts have
subjected this presumed exclusivity to a wholly judicial doctrine of "fair use,"
whereby certain uses and copying are "fair" and therefore permissible without
the author's consent.4 Effectively, then, the copyright proprietor does not have
a complete monopoly despite the statutory language.5
* Member of the District of Columbia and New York bars.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Stephen M. Nassau and yet
accepts sole responsibility for the article.
I Typed transcript of oral argument of Dec. 7, 1974, at 39-40, before the United States
Supreme Court in Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 43 U.S.L.W. 4314 (U.S. Feb.
25, 1975).
2 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
3 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
4 2 M. NMMER, COPYRIGHT § 145 (1974); Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States,
487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by equally divided court, 43 U.S.L.W. 4314 (U.S. Feb.
25, 1975); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also G. BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944); B.
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEw oF COPYRIGHT 57 (1967) (" 'use' is not the same thing as
'infringement'").
5 See, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 392 U.S. 390, 393 (1968);
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 566 (1869). See also Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
"FAIR USE" IN COPYRIGHT LAW
This judicial doctrine of fair use, developed in the face of a seemingly
exclusive copyright privilege, recognizes the public interest against monopoly; a
leading early commentator once stated of fair use, "The recognition of this
doctrine is essential to the growth of knowledge .... 6
Notwithstanding the traditional restrictive view of fair use,' it is here sub-
mitted that fair use-the right of reasonable access to copyrighted materials-
has constitutional protection both directly and under the penumbra of the first
and ninth amendments. This constitutional dimension protects the right of
reasonable access to our cultural, educational, scientific, historical, technical, and
intellectual heritage.
An attempt to place fair use in its proper constitutional framework, however,
immediately uncovers a conflict between the public's constitutional right of
reasonable access to copyrighted materials and the copyright owner's statutory
privilege under the copyright law. In the latter situation, the Constitution grants
copyright owners no rights. It merely authorizes Congress, under severe limita-
tions, to enact copyright legislation. At most, the copyright owner has a statutory
privilege, not a constitutional right.
This article proposes a conceptual clarification of the constitutionally pro-
tected right of fair use, a resultant reformulation of some basic copyright law
principles, and a contribution to the survival of the copyright system itself.
II. Preliminary Constitutional Considerations
Before exploring the specific relationship of copyright to the first and ninth
amendments, it is fruitful to consider two preliminary constitutional principles.
A. Copyright Owners
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants no rights to authors. It merely
grants power to Congress to enact copyright legislation. In the very first case in
which the Supreme Court considered this problem, the Court specifically rejected
the argument that the constitutional provisions did not create a right but merely
protected one already in existence.'
A long and uninterrupted line of cases holds unequivocally that, apart from
6 E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
386-87 (1879).
7 See Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 118, 122-24 (1965); 2 NIMMER,
supra note 4, at 644.
8 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661, 663 (8 Pet.) (1834). To the same effect, see
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932); Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909).
The House Committee's Report on the current Copyright Law of 1909 also made the
same point:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Consti-
tution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, for
the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statutory rights.
.The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress shall
have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909). See also statement of House floor manag-
er of 1909 bill, 43 CONG. REc. 3765 (1909) ("there is no property right in writings").
[V'ol. 50:.790]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
common law protection for unpublished works, copyright protection is completely
and solely a statutory matter9 and that copyright is only a privilege or a fran-
chise."° It is settled law that any copyright right is simply a creature of statute,1
wholly a matter of congressional discretion to grant or to withhold. 2 In connec-
tion with copyrights, "the Constitution is permissive" not mandatory. 3 The
conditions upon which copyright is granted are wholly within the constitutional
power of Congress to prescribe. 4 In fact, the history of copyright law shows that
an author has no constitutional property right in or to copyright protection and
that any right an author obtains is a discretionary privilege to be granted or with-
held by Congress, which has the power to annex whatever conditions it deems
wise and expedient.' The very first copyright law, enacted in 1790, gave pro-
tection only to maps, charts, and books, and that only for a 14-year period
plus renewal of 14 years. It did not cover periodicals, drawings, works of
art, musical compositions, dramatic compositions--to name but a few. Even the
present and far more extensive law is not all-inclusive and places limits on
authors' copyright privileges. Congress limited both the number of years during
which an author may exercise copyright monopoly privileges and the uses to
which the copyright owner's privileges attach. The courts have also developed a
further limitation through the doctrine of fair use. Two years ago the Supreme
Court held that the constitutional copyright provision does not provide exclusive
federal control over copyrights.'"
None of the foregoing is intended to disparage the constitutional grant of
authority to the Congress to enact copyright legislation. This laudable purpose,
however, is restricted by other constitutional considerations. Copyright is a
privilege conferred by statute and not a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
B. Constitutional Protections
That the articulation or enforcement of the constitutional right of reasonable
access through fair use might appear novel is no defense against its validity.
Chief Justice Burger has stated that it makes no difference "that it has taken this
Court nearly two centuries to 'discover' a constitutional mandate."' 7  The
9 Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, Inc. 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960); Bentley v. Tibbals, 223
F. 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1915); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd,
154 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1946); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
10 Local Landmarks v. Price, 170 F.2d 715, 718 (5th Cir. 1948).
11 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907); Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1939); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo, 147 F. 226, 227
(2d Cir. 1906), aff'd 209 U.S. 1, 15 (1908). See also Loew's Inc. v. C.B.S., 131 F. Supp.
165, 173 (S.D.Cal. 1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by equally divided court,
356 U.S. 43 (1958).
12 Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 579, 580 (2d Cir. 1941); Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas.
180, 185 (No. 7644) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861).
13 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972).
14 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663-64 (8 Pet.) (1834). See also Application of
Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958); Stuff v. La
Budde Feed & Grain Co., 42 F. Supp. 493, 496 (E.D. Wis. 1941). See NrMMER, supra note
4, at 14.
15 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
16 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553, 558 (1973).
17 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22 (1970).
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Supreme Court elsewhere reinterpreted a 200-year-old and admittedly"8 settled
doctrine of American legal history, in what Mr. Justice Powell called "a change
in focus in the Court's approach" '19 and the need for "a fresh look at the
question. 20 Only in 1972 did the Supreme Court find constitutional infirmity in
capital punishment under the eighth amendment although admittedly it had
"been employed throughout our history."' 2' It was not until 1973 that it was
held that antiabortion statutes were unconstitutional22 and that a six-member
jury in civil proceedings complied with the seventh amendment. 3 Not until 1974
did the Supreme Court rule that the President of the United States has no
absolute right of executive privilege24 and only in 1975 did the Supreme Court
rule that high school students were entitled to due process prior to suspension
from school, 5 that a "live" theatre charged with obscenity was entitled to the
first amendments protection against impermissible prior restraint,26 and that the
due process protection of the fifth amendment forbids "gender-based differentia-
tion" between men and women in social security benefits.2
The very fact that constitutional protection for fair use has not been pre-
viously decided is in itself an aid now. The Constitution of the United States
was made for an undefined and expanding future." As the question of consti-
tutional protection for fair use would now be a new one before the Court, it
would be at liberty to decide the issue upon reason, unfettered by an inveterate
course of precedent upon it.29 As the ancient lawgiver Maimonides put it, the
gates of interpretation are never closed.30
In this regard, it is important to recognize that the Constitution's "adapt-
ability" to new circumstances and situations is especially true as to the liberties
protected by the first amendment. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: "Some
words are confined to their history; some are starting points for history. Words
are intellectual and moral currency. . . . Like currency words sometimes ap-
preciate or depreciate in value."'" In constitutional interpretation, it is necessary
to go far beyond the meaning of the phrase in isolation to its "guiding history." 2
18 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
19 Id. at 372 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 376. See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23 Colgrove v. Bettin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
24 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
25 Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
26 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 43 U.S.L.W. 4365 (U.S. March 18, 1975).
27 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 43 U.S.L.W. 4393 (U.S. March 19, 1975). See also Getman,
The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. Rxv. 157; Forrester,
The Feminists-Why Have They Not Yet Succeeded? 61 A.B.A.J. 333 (1975).
28 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
29 Conner v. Long, 104 U.S. 228, 243 (1881).
30 THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED 327-28 (S. Pines ed. 1963).
31 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLum. L. Rzv. 527, 537-
38 (1947).
32 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 619 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"Reasoning which in one age would make no impression whatsoever, in the next age is received
with enthusiastic applause." I. Lrcky, HiSTOiy OF THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SPIrr
OF RATIONALISM IN EUROPE Vii (1865).
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As such, the purpose of constitutional provisions becomes the controlling feature
in their application:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions .... In the ap-
plication of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution
would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy
and power .... Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this
has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have
developed against narrow and restrictive construction.33
The courts have long been responsive to the special need for guarding the
Bill of Rights, and especially first amendment rights, "with a jealous eye." 4
The extraordinary genius of the Bill of Rights is its adaptability to the problems
of each successive generation. The present generation's special and urgent
problem is the protection and assurance of the American people's right of reason-
able access to its cultural heritage. The history of the struggle for freedom of
press and speech bars any notion that the Bill of Rights provides freedom to print
and disseminate information but denies freedom to acquire it through reasonable
access and fair use. Today, freedom of press embodies reasonable access through
fair use of the nation's heritage.
III. The First Amendment and Reasonable Access to Copyrighted Matter
The first amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press protects the right
of reasonable access to copyrighted material against a monopolistic construction
of the statutory copyright privilege. In balancing a copyright proprietor's stat-
utory privileges against the constitutional protection for the public's right to
know, read, and hear, the balance must be struck in favor of the constitutional
right. Established by statute, the copyright privilege does not prevail against the
constitutional guarantee of the first amendment."5
A. People versus Publishers
Fair use is a right of the American people. The Bill of Rights exemplified
33 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (emphasis added). Cf. Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34 AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941). Cf. Brennan, The Supreme Court
& the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HAtv. L. R.v. 1, 1-2 (1965).
35 "Because Congress is granted authority to legislate in -a given field, it does not follow
that such a grant immunizes Congress from the limitations of the Bill of Rights, including the
Bill of Rights." Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of Free
Speech & Press? 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1180, 1182 (1970). For an argument that the same person
cannot avail himself of both copyright and first amendment rights, see Brief for Respondent City
of Los Angeles at 10, 17, Smith v. California, 375 U.S. 259 (1963) (judgment vacated and case
remanded in light of State court's opinion).
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a clear rationale that a free press was the only instrumentality for protecting the
public's right to know."
Throughout American history this concept of the press as an instrumentality
of the American people has been pervasive in judicial readings of the first amend-
ment. Mr. Justice Sutherland, in connection with a claim of abridgement of
freedom of press, wrote that "The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity
here invoked was to preserve an untrammelled press as a vital source of public
information."3 7
Freedom of press is a right of the American people; the press is merely a
trustee of that right. Freedom of press was not designed as a special privilege for
the publishing business but rather as an extension of the personal rights of each
American. It guarantees an individual's rights and was thus joined in the first
amendment with the rights of free speech, assembly, and petition.
The courts have characterized freedom of speech and press as fundamental
personal rights and liberties, thus reflecting the belief of the framers of the Con-
stitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free governments by
free men.3" As such, it is imperative to recognize that the first amendment's guar-
antee of freedom of press is "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of us all.""n Free press is only a shorthand way of saying that the press
must be free because of the right of all Americans to be informed."0
B. The Right of Access and the Bill of Rights
Rights of access, as such, have been increasingly recognized by the Supreme
Court as an integral part of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.4" These
rights of access are ancillary to, and come within the penumbra of, rights pro-
36 "The First Amendment... rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the pub-
lic, that a free press is a condition of a free society." Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
37 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
38 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
39 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967). See also United States v. Powell, 171 F.
Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
40 Arthur Hays Sulzburger of the New York Times addressed this issue:
Perhaps we ought to ask ourselves now just what freedom of the press really is....
Freedom of press-or, to be precise, the benefit of freedom of the press-belongs to
everyone, to the citizens as well as the publisher. The publisher is not granted the
privilege of independence simply to provide him with a more favored position in the
community that is accorded to other citizens. He enjoys an explicitly defined inde-
pendence because it is the only condition under which he can fully perform his role,
which is to inform fully, fairly and comprehensively. The crux is not the publisher's
freedom to print; it is rather the citizen's right to know! What I would point out is
that freedom of the press is your right as citizens and not mine as a publisher.
Address to Trustees of New York Public Library, Nov. 13, 1956 at 9 (privately printed).
41 These rights of access include: the right of "suitable access to social, political, aes-
thetic, moral and other ideas and experiences," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 '(1969); the right to "receive information and ideas," Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 760, 762-65 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); the right to
receive printed matter, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); the right of
access to certain religious publications, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); the right of access
to the courts, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513
(1972) ; the right of addressees of letters to read the letters without censorship, Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
[Vol. 50:790]
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tected by the Bill of Rights or other provisions of the Constitution. Likewise, the
right of reasonable access through fair use to copyrighted materials pertaining
to the cultural, historical, educational, scientific, technical, and religious heritage
of the nation comes within the penumbra of the right of free press guaranteed by
the first amendment.
C. The Right of Free Press and Speech and the Right to Read and Hear
The first amendment would be sterile today if its sanctions were limited to
the mere act of printing or writing; the Zenger case decided that over 200 years
ago.
4 2
The Supreme Court has ruled that freedom of press protects not only the
publisher's right to print 43 and publish" and the distributor's right to circulate,45
but also the public's "right to receive information and ideas,"'46 and to read and
hear.
In Butler v. Michigan,4' a state statute made a criminal offense of the pub-
lication, sale, and distribution of any literature "tending to the corruption of the
morals of youth." The statute was challenged as an unconstitutional infringement
of freedom of press and due process under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The state's Attorney General denied that the statute abridged either the free
press clause of the first amendment or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. And the Attorney General of Texas, amicus curiae, claimed that the
book there in question was not within the protection of the first amendment's
freedom of press. The Court unanimously found the statute unconstitutional,
holding that the incidence of its enactment served to reduce the adult population
of Michigan to reading only what was fit for children and thereby arbitrarily
curtailed a liberty of the individual, an indispensable condition for the mainte-
nance of a free society."5
In 1961 the Court included the right to know as one of the protections
afforded by the first amendment. In so holding, it reasoned that the first amend-
ment enlarges rather than limits freedom in literature, the arts, politics, eco-
nomics, law, and other fields. Its basic aim. was to unlock all ideas for argument,
debate, and dissemination.49  Such unlocking of ideas requires reasonable ac-
42 As far back as 1644, Milton's Areopagitica was a defense of "the liberty of unlicensed
printing," R. MCKEON, R. MERTON & W. GELLHORN, THE FREEDOM TO READ 43 (1957).
See also Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, (1877), cited with approval, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 452 (1938).
43 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. at 452; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948). See
also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
44 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); New York Times v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
45 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
46 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ; Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
47 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
48 Id. at 383-84.
49 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 81 (1961). See also Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 771 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). A similar protection for the .right
to learn emanates from the fourteenth amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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cess to materials subject to copyright protection through fair use.' °
In 1965, the Supreme Court specifically proclaimed the right of school
teachers to read, as part of their first amendment rights."' In 1969, the Court
protected "the right to read""2 itself; moreover, in 1974, the Court further
broadened this constitutional protection by also finding it within the constitu-
tional guarantee for free speech under the first amendment. In Procunier V.
Martinez,5 3 the Court confronted the censorship of mail written by prisoners.
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Powell said:
Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words
on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the ad-
dressee... .Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored cor-
respondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded
in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
54
Thus, the Constitution protects more than freedom to print or write; without
reading by the public, publication would be of little value. The constitutional
protections for freedom of press and speech were designed to achieve an end: the
right of the public to read. In order to accomplish this end-which the Supreme
Court has ruled to be included within the constitutional protection of each in-
dividual-it is necessary to have reasonable access. And this freedom must, at the
very least, include freedom of access to materials affecting the educational,
cultural, historical, political, scientific, and religious background of the nation."5
The reach of the first amendment is well illustrated by Kleindienst v. Man-
del" where both the majority and minority agreed that the first amendment
guaranteed access to hear, to receive information, to learn, and to know."
See also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). See also
Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 480, 488, 492, 512-13 (D. D.C. 1967), appeal dis-
missed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969), where the Court struck down a school board's "track system"
of assigning pupils as being contrary to their right to learn. The decision was based on the
equal protection clause.
50 Cardozo put it well: "There is no freedom without choice and there is no choice with-
out knowledge .... Implicit, therefore, in the very notion of liberty is the liberty of the mind
to absorb and beget. . . . At the root of all liberty is the liberty to know." B. CARDozo,
LEGAL PARADOXES 104 (1928).
51 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
52 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
53 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
54 Id. at 408.
55 See Goldstein, Copyright & the First Amendment, 70 COLUbi. L. Rav. 983, 995 (1970).
56 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
57 Mr. Justice Blackmuan spoke for the Court at 762-63:
In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to
"receive information and ideas":
"It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and press] ... necessarily protects
the right to receive... . Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
• ." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
He also cited Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) as protecting the right of workers
"to hear what he [a labor organizer] had to say."
For the right to hear as being within the penumbra of the freedom of speech provision of
the first amendment, see also Molpus v. Fortune, 432 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1970); Pickings v.
Bruce, 430 F.2d 595,598-99 (8th Cir. 1970); Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th
Cir. 1969); ACLU v. Radford, 315 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970); Smith v. University of
Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Snyder v. Board' of Trustees, 286 F. Supp.
927 (N.D. Il. 1968).
[Vol. 50:790]
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There, in a comment peculiarly appropriate to fair use, Mr. Justice Blackmun
stated for the Court:
The Government also suggests that the First Amendment is inapplicable
because appellees have free access to Mandel's ideas through his books and
speeches .... While alternative means of access to Mandel's ideas might be
a relevant factor were we called upon to balance First Amendment rights
against governmental regulatory interests-a balance we find unnecessary
here in the light of the discussion that follows . . . - we are loath to hold
on this record that existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any
constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this particular form
of access.55
The Court's previous decisions concerning the "right to receive information" were
accepted by the dissenting opinions as well. 9
Increasing attention has been given of late, especially by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan,6' to Meiklejohn's concept that the key to the first amendment is not the
speaker's words but the hearers' minds . 1 The comments of both majority and
minority in Kleindienst, concerning the right to hear, as part of the first amend-
ment, apply with equal force to the right to read through the right of access to
copyrighted reading matter. But, it may be asked, where is there anything in the
first amendment about the right to read? The same type of question was faced
directly by Mr. Justice Brennan in a case where the very issue of the right to
read was involved and where the Court specifically stated that the first amend-
ment rights of school teachers protected their right to read.6" In a concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan said:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guarantee of ac-
cess to publications. However, the protection of the Bill of Rights goes
beyond the specific guarantees to protect from congressional abridgement
those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express
guarantees fully meaningful.... I think the right to receive publications
is such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider
them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and
no buyers.6
58 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
59 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote that "The First Amendment involves not only the right to
speak and publish but also the right to hear, to learn, to know. Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564." Id. at 771. Mr. Justice
Marshall's dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brennan joined, stated:
As the majority correctly demonstrates, in a variety of contexts this Court has
held that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas,
the freedom to hear as well as the freedom to speak ... the right to speak and hear
-including the right to inform others and be informed about public issues-are
inextricably part of that process. The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear
are inseparable; they axe two sides of the same coin. Id. at 775.
See also Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court justice and the
Philosopher, 28 RuTGERs L. REv. 41, 42 (1974).
60 Brennan, The Supreme Court & the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HAxv. L. Rv. 1, 1-2 ((1965).
61 A. MEXKLEJOHN, POLITICAL Fa .- zoM 25-28 (1960).
62 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
63 Id. at 308.
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In a similar situation concerning the right of association, Mr. Justice Powell
answered that "the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct interference
with fundamental rights.... We are not free to disregard the practical realities.""
Mr. Justice Powell then extended "the practical realities" to a constitutional
recognition that the right to read a letter written by a prisoner is guaranteed to
the addressee of that letter by the free speech guarantee of the first amendment."5
In this context, fair use is the legal vehicle developed by the courts for
effectuating the public's access to copyrighted matter, a light guaranteed under
the first amendment's protection of the right to read, the right to hear, and the
right to know.
IV. The Ninth Amendment and the Right to Know, Read, and Hear
The ninth amendment to the Constitution provides that "The enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people." This is the reserved right of the American
people to all rights not specifically granted by the Constitution: the right to all
unenumerated rights. The framers of the Constitution believed that there existed
certain additional, fundamental rights which stand alongside those fundamental
rights specifically contained within the first eight amendments. Viewed in this
way, these other valuable fundamental rights should not be abrogated merely
because they have not been enumerated. In determining which rights are funda-
mental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and
private notions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and [collective] con-
science of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so rooted [there] as
to be ranked as fundamental."" Thus, the inquiry is whether a right involved
is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions." '
There is strong historical justification for the belief that the framers of the
Bill of Rights intended the ninth amendment to apply "where the asserted right
appears to the court as fundamental to a free society but is, nevertheless, not
specified in the Bill of Rights" ;"8 that is, constitutional formulations must not be
narrowly interpreted. Along this line, a leading legal commentator has indicated
that, whatever else the amendment may cover, it provides for "the right to have
access to information." 9
64 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972).
65 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974).
66 Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 493-94.
68 Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights Retained by the People"? 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787,
808 (1962). See also State v. Abellano, 50 Hawaii 384, 390, 393, 441 P.2d 333 (1968)
(Levinson, J., concurring):
The Ninth Amendment is a reservoir of personal rights necessary to preserve the
dignity and existence of man in a free society.
The Ninth Amendment is the place to which we must turn for protection of indi-
vidual liberty from infringements not enumerated and perhaps not contemplated by
the founding fathers.
69 Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the
People, 51 NIAQ. L. Rav. 121, 139 (1967). The author noted that "[r]elated to this right to
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As to the impact of the copyright provision of the Constitution on the ninth
amendment in Ashwander v. TVA"0 the Supreme Court indicated that "[T]he
Ninth Amendment... does not withdraw the rights which are expressly granted
to the Federal Government. The question is as to the scope of the grant and
whether there are inherent limitations....
As such, the ninth amendment's reach starts, at the least, from the Consti-
tution's limited scope of the grant for copyright legislation and from the inherent
limitations so clearly illustrated by the judicial development of the doctrine of
fair use, notwithstanding the seemingly complete monopolies granted by the
copyright laws.
Under the ninth amendment, "rights may arise or appear by reason of
limitations placed upon or by limits of granted powers."
72
A person has the right not to have government act where it lacks power.
In addition, he has other rights, which deny government power to act
where otherwise it might. For example, the government has the power to
regulate bankruptcy proceedings [U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Section 8],
but it lacks power to regulate them in such a way that a property owner
is deprived of property without due process of law [Louisville Bank v. Reed-
ford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)]. Though government has the power to preserve
its own existence [Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951)], that power is
tempered by the rights guaranteed by the first and fifth amendments [Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)]. Similarly, where a person has
an inherent right, recognized by the ninth amendment, it protects him
against some exercise of power which might otherwise be proper... It is
in areas where government has power to act that it is important to the
individual to have positive rights.7 3
The balancing of various constitutional provisions seemingly applicable to
the same set of facts is a common judicial experienceJ Thus, notwithstanding
the copyright clause, the ninth amendment guarantees and protects the right to
read the cultural heritage of the nation and authorizes reasonable access to such
heritage through fair use of copyrighted materials. These rights and their ef-
fectuation through the fair use doctrine come within what Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court in Griswold and specifically mentioning the ninth amend-
ment, called "penumbras, formed by emanations from those [Bill of Rights]
guaranties that help give them life and substance.11
5
V. Effect of the Constitutional Dimension of Fair Use
If fair use does have constitutional protection under the first and ninth
amendments, two effects arise from this restructured constitutional perspective:
information is the right to know as encompassed in academic and cultural freedom. A college
professor or school teacher has the right to pursue knowledge."
70 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
71 Id. at 330-31.
72 Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309, 311
(1936).
73 Comment, The Ninth Amendment, 30 ALBANY L. Rav. 89, 99 (1966).
74 See, e.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Cali-
fornia v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 115 (1972).
75 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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(1) The need for balancing of rights, with the public interest having priority over
the copyright proprietor, and (2) a shift of the burden of proof from the alleged
infringer to the alleger of infringement.
A. Balancing Interests: Public Interest in Reasonable Access Through Fair
Use Outweighs the Statutory Privilege of a Copyright Proprietor
Balancing has a unique role in copyright matters. As Story said in one of the
very early cases: "Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class
of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics
of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be... almost evanescent." '
Even without constitutional assistance, the Court of Claims in Williams &
Wilkins "gave the benefit of the doubt" to nonprofit users rather than to the
copyright owners in evaluating fair use."'
1. Primacy of the Public Interest in Copyright Law
The Congress, the courts, the Register of Copyrights, and legal commenta-
tors have all affirmed the primacy of the public interest over the copyright
proprietor's interest.
The House Report on the present law stated that copyright was enacted
"not primarily for the benefits of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the
public."78s The Supreme Court has stated that "the copyright law... makes a
reward to the owner of secondary consideration. 79 The Register of Copyrights
reported to Congress that "within limits the author's interests coincide with those
of the public. Where they conflict the public interest must prevail. 8s0 Goldstein
put it thus:
[W]hether a use is fair is determined on the basis of a number of factors,
predominantly on the strength of the public interest in free access....
Copyright and trademark law . . . have also experienced a marked shift
toward wider public access.8 '
76 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Gas. 342, 344 (No. 4901) (C.D.D. Mass. 1841). Holmes warned
courts of this sort of special problem:
I think that judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of
weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of
the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to
leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often uncon-
scious ....
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
77 The Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
78 H.R. RaE. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
79 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Accord, United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46 (1962).
80 COPYR1GHT LAw REVISION, Report of the Register of Copyrights, House Comm. Print,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961).
81 Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALI. L. Ray. 873, 890,
893 (1971). See also Goldstein, Copyright & the First Amendment, 70 COLUMx. L. REv.
983 (1970) (Supreme Court's tilt toward public interest in libel and privacy cases).
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In balancing the copyright owner's mere statutory privilege and the user's con-
stitutional rights, the decision must lean to the user. 2
With particular reference to the judicial doctrine of fair use, the courts gave
as a justification for their doctrine the constitutional requirement to subordinate
the interest of the copyright proprietor to the public interest."s Nevertheless,
until recently, a specific application of the determination of the public interest was
not dispositive on whether a particular use had been fair." Failure to accord
fair use its proper constitutional status and protection is an actual intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area resulting in conspicuous rejection or unrecognized
suppression of reasonable access through fair use.
2. Strict Construction of Copyright Monopoly
According to the Supreme Court, copyright is a monopoly.s5 "Copyrights,"
the Attorney General of the United States has stated, "are forms of monopolies." '
Even at its best, "copyright necessarily involves the right to restrict as well as to
monopolize the diffusion of knowledge."8 "
Insufficient attention has been paid to the power of censorship inherent in
the copyright concept. Copyrights
may be used to suppress rather than to exploit access to ideas and develop-
ments. By pyramiding ownership of many individual copyrights in a
particular area, a single person can establish an "enterprise monopoly."
This runs contrary to the thrust of the First Amendment. With the
establishment of an "enterprise monopoly," its owner would have procured
not only the capacity to regulate the timing and pricing of public access to
its inventory, but also an ability to control, in rough proportion to the size
of his copyright aggregation, the selection of works made available to the
public.
88
This facet of copyright protection revives earlier conceptions that copyright was
82 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). See also
Rosemont Enterprises Inc. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966); Time,
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
83 Berlin v. B. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964); Rosemont Enterprises Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d
Cir. 1966); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
84 See Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm, 19 COPYRIGHT
LAW SyMPosIUm 43 (1971). And this despite statutory recognition in the copyright law itself,
such as, for example, authorization for nonprofit performance of certain works publicly, 17
U.S.C. § l(c), (e) (1971), and the judicial recognition of "fair use" as an exercise in bal-
ancing in behalf of the public interest in access without control by the copyright proprietor.
See Goldstein, Copyright & the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. Rlv. 983, 1101 (1970).
85 "The owner of the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and
content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his property."
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
86 H.R. REP. No. 1742, on H.J. Res. 676, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1962).
87 Hudon, The Copyright Period: Weighing Personal Against Public Interest, 49 A.B.A.J.
759 (1963).
88 Kritzer, Copyright Protection for Sports Broadcasts and the Public's Right of Access, 15
IDEA 385, 397 (1971). Goldstein thus described the situation: "Dispensed by the govern-
ment, copyright still constitutes the grant of a monopoly over expression. The threat, which
derives specifically from copyright's restraint upon what may be said and heard in the public,
has not been noticed by the Supreme Court." Goldstein, Copyright & the First Amendment,
70 COLUM. L. Rav. 983, 983-84 (1970).
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a means of censorship designed to prevent the distribution of heretical literature. "
However, the constitutional dimension of fair use protects against such blatant
censorship9 ° and refutes the claim of copyright proprietors that fair use really
depends upon whether the reasonable copyright owner would consent to the use
in contention.9 1 Copyright proprietors have no consensual or other authority
under copyright law to deny the public its first amendment rights to reasonable
access through fair use, nor to oust the public's constitutional rights through sup-
pression or demands for ransom (e.g., "royalties") sanctioned by government
protection for an exclusive legal monopoly.
Whether denominated fair use or first amendment protections, the public's
constitutional right of reasonable access must be protected by both the Congress
and the courts. The constitutional rights of the public to reasonable access to
copyrighted materials through fair use is a protection against control or sup-
pression by nonconsent or by economic demands of the copyright owner. The
Supreme Court has expressed its antipathy to broadening the scope of the copy-
right owner's monopoly.92
In Williams & Wilkins, the publisher argued that whatever may have been
legal prior to photocopying, the whole context has changed (to the presumed
detriment of the user's legal rights) with the advent of the photocopying machine.
This is erroneous in constitutional terms. That the photocopy apparatus was not
contemplated in 1909, when the present copyright law was enacted, gives the
copyright owner no greater monopoly than he would have had with earlier
systems of reproducing copies." The Copyright Office submitted an arnicus brief
in Mazer v. Stein,"' arguing that the method of reproduction does not affect the
copyrightability of a work:
Literary works which in an earlier era would perhaps have been reproduced
by hand on illuminated parchment or in other single copies have not become
less copyrightable by virtue of their present reproduction in thousands of
copies by manufacturing techniques involving the use of movable types,
plates, etc. Similarly, painting masterpieces once reproduced on canvas
or as murals in single copies are now frequently reproduced in color plates
89 Note, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Congressional Power to Enact Copyright
Legislation, 1972 UTAH L. Rav. 534, 536. See B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright,
2-9 (1967). The monopoly holder has no obligation to maintain the work in print or other-
wise available or even to grant permission for royalties.
90 "Our distaste for censorship-reflecting the natural distaste of a free people-is deep-
written in our law." Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v. Conrad, 43 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4368 (1975).
91 Study No. 14, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., in COPYRIGHT LAw
REviSION (Comm. Print 1960).
92 The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control over all uses of his
copyrighted work. Instead, § 1 of the Act enumerates several "rights" that are made
"exclusive" to the holder of the copyright. If a person, without authorization from
the copyright holder, puts a copyrighted work to a use within the scope of one of
these "exclusive rights," he infringes the copyright. If he puts the work to a use not
enumerated in § 1, he does not infringe.
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-95 (1968). See also
B. KAPLAN, AN UNHUPRIED VMw oF COPYRIGHT 57 (1967).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 650 (1972), where the
Court held that the FCC had jurisdiction over CATV "was developed. long after enactment
of the Communications Act of 1934." See also Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion at
675.
94 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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for distribution in thousands of individual copies or in periodical or book
form. Neither the mechanical and manufacturing processes used in this
reproduction [nor] the number of copies . . . would appear to affect the
copyrightability or -essential nature of the work itself.95
It would seem that the same proposition constitutionally applies to fair use and
that reasonable access through fair use does not become an infringement because
it is done by photoduplicators rather than by hand.
Thus, in terms of balancing rights, the monopoly-granting power of the
Congress under the copyright provision must be construed in a manner con-
sonant with two fundamental considerations: (1) Congress' monopoly-granting
power in copyright is very limited and must be strictly construed, and (2) the
copyright-granting power of Congress must be subordinate to rights of reasonable
access through fair use which are protected by the first and ninth amendments.
B. The Copyright Proprietor's Burden of Proof: To Show Alleged
Infringement Not Protected by the First or Ninth Amendment
Without its constitutional dimension and protection, fair use has been
relegated to the status of an affirmative defense, with the user being required to
carry the burden of proof that the use was not an actionable infringement."8
Thus, the whole defense of the public interest and constitutional right is thrown
on the alleged infringer.9" Significant procedural effects attach to the legal con-
clusions that copyright is merely a statutory privilege whereas fair use has con-
stitutional protection. Once fair use has been properly vested with its appropriate
constitutional status, the burden of proof shifts to the copyright proprietor to
prove that an alleged infringement is not protected as a fair use under the first
and ninth amendments. This allocation of the burden of proof is an appropriate
adjustment between a statutory privilege (copyright) and a constitutionally
guaranteed right (fair use).
VI. Fair Use and the Survival of the Copyright System
The recognition of the proper constitutional status of fair use may become
one of the major means for protecting the copyright system from collapse. The
95 Brief for the Copyright Office at 30-31, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (empha-
sis supplied).
96 B. RINGER & P. GrrLIN, COPYRsoETs 68-69 (rev. ed. 1965); NiMmER, supra note 4.
But see opinion of the Court of Claims in Williams and Wilkins where the court stated: "[W]e
conclude that plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant's use of the copyrighted material
has been 'unfair'...." 487 F.2d at 1362.
97 Goldstein described this situation:
The infringer is, in any case, the sole proponent of the generalized interest in
access; for the courts to prejudice his position with assumptions of infringement's
intrinsic badness would significantly impede vindication of the public interest...
Sanction of the fair use defense-which accredits the public interest in access to
didactic expressions-recognizes the alleged infringer's standing to assert this public
interest.
Goldstein, Copyright & the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. Rzv. 983, 1056 (1970). See also
Kaplan's comment, which has become a vade mecum of the Supreme Court: "The funda-
mental [is] 'use' is not the same thing as 'infringement,' that use short of infringement is to be
encouraged.. . ." B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW oF COPVYRIGHT 57 (1967).
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copyright system is in real trouble today. Among the major causes of its current
disarray are the unwarranted assumption that it is necessarily relevant to all
intellectual creativity and its apparent inability to cope with the strains of ac-
commodating commercially derived copyright concepts with noncommercial
creativity and nonprofit uses."' Developments may already have passed copy-
right by and made it irrelevant, or at least ineffective, in coping with modern
technological developments (such as TV, CATV, satellites and computers), in
being a meaningful vehicle for solving major issues of national social policy (non-
profit educational, library, and research uses of copyrighted materials), and in
serving as an aid in. international cooperation (especially with developing
countries) ." A collapse of the copyright concept will not be the first time that the
Founding Fathers failed to anticipate, in the original Constitution, the course of
future history. 00 It is too early to predict whether, but not too soon to fear that,
copyright may fall into this category of historical relics. On the other hand,
judicial and legislative recognition of the constitutional primacy of fair use over
statutory copyright monopoly, at the very least as to reasonable noncommercial
and nonprofit educational, research, and scholarly uses of copyrighted materials,
might substantially help to alleviate the strains and thus perhaps protect the
copyright concept from obsolescence in this area of intellectual works and uses.
Serious disenchantment has set in with the very concept of the copyright
system. Kaplan expressed it thus:
Copyright is likely to recede, to lose relevance, in respect of most kinds
of uses of a great amount of scholarly production which now sees light in
a mdlange of learned journals and in the output of university presses....
For many of the uses available through the machine, exaction of copyright
payments will be felt unnecessary to provide incentive or headstart-
especially so, when the works owe their origin, as so many will, to one or
another kind of public support.
I am suggesting that copyright or the larger part of its controls will
appear unneeded, merely obstructive, as applied to certain sectors of produc-
tion and that here copyright law will lapse into disuse and may disappear.
For the rest, copyright will persist to serve its historic purposes.101
Another commentator even suggested that "it would be possible.., to do without
copyright" and that the publishing industry could operate quite profitably, and
more beneficially to the book users, without the artificial protection of copyright
law.0 2
98 Note the language "untainted by any commercial gain from the reproduction" in the
Williams and Wilkins case, 487 F.2d at 1354.
99 See Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright - Past, Present,
and Future, 56 GEo. L. J. 1050, 1079 (1968).
100 For example, public election of U. S. Senators, voting by 18-year-old persons, abolition
of slavery, authority for income taxation, etc. For changes without textual amendment of the
Constitution, see notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
101 B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VMw OF COPYRIOHT 120-21 (1967). See also Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Pro-
grams, 84 HAxv. L. Rv. 281, 283-4, 321 (1970).
102 Breyer, supra note 101, at 291-322. But see Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copy-
right Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Prof. Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1100
(1971); Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 75 (1972).
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Let there be no misunderstanding. This article proposes neither abolition
nor discard of the copyright system. On the contrary, what is suggested is a
constitutional means for rescuing it from its accelerating slide into honorable
oblivion as an antiquated concept which no longer seems to serve the needs of
at least some of its purported beneficiaries. In the fields of nonprofit academic
and educational creativity, copyright protection is not normally or substantially
a significant or even relevant factor. Part of the difficulty in coping with the
present situation is the failure of copyright law to differentiate between copyright
in commercial enterprises and copyright in nonprofit and noncommercial in-
tellectual activity.
The copyright law has become-or is fast becoming-irrelevant to the
preponderance of creativity in nonprofit education, research, and scholarship.
One of the most persistent characteristics of creativity in noncommercial educa-
tion, research, and scholarship is the creator's desire for wide and untrammeled
dissemination and circulation of his writings, regardless of financial royalties. This
noncopyright motivation is a key to the bulk of current nonprofit intellectual
creativity; the traditional wisdom that copyright is a necessary incentive is there-
fore irrelevant to nonprofit intellectual creativity.' More bluntly, a substantial
part of the copyright system's difficulties, in connection with nonprofit and non-
commercial uses, is its erroneous assumption of its own necessity as an incentive
to creativity. In its present contours, copyright law is really a largely ignored
relic of the past insofar as such nonprofit creativity is concerned. Nor will the
revision bill in its present form0 rescue copyright law from either its ineffective-
ness or further breakdown, at least in the realm of nonprofit intellectual cre-
ativity and noncommercial uses of copyrighted works.
Consequently, either a new system or a meaningful differentiation of the
commercial copyright system is necessary both for the viability of copyright and
for noncommercial intellectual creativity; there has to be a new concept0 5 or at
least a separate system'0 0 for nonprofit uses by noncommercial education, re-
search, and scholarship-within or without the copyright orbit. In any event,
103 In Williams and Wilkins, amicus briefs by the Association of Research Libraries (at
18-45) and by the American Library Association (at 14-20) argued that the Copyright Act
was never intended to prohibit the copying of printed works for private use. And the Brief
for the United States, respondent in the case, said (at 17 n.26 ) that "the copying of material for
private use may well be outside the scope of the Copyright Act ab initio; at least, the fact that
the copy is made for personal use and not for commercial benefit is strong support for the con-
clusion that it is a non-infringing fair use." The Brief of the United States also stated that
the Supreme Court "has implied it shares this view" in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
555 (1973).
104 S. 22 and H. R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
105 At least for nonprofit uses by education, research and scholarship, such a "new system"
cannot be a compulsory licensing requirement, since that would force the American people to
pay for what they have the right to know, read or hear through the constitutional protection
for reasonable access. A mandatory licensing system would destroy fair use.
106 There is a long-established precedent within the present copyright law for a separate
system by means of an exemption from copyright for nonprofit uses of copyrighted materials.
Under 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) certain nonprofit uses and reproduction of lectures, sermons, ad-
dresses or similar production or other nondramatic literary works are exempted from copy-
right coverage. And 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) gives the copyright owner of a musical composition
only the right, in this connection, "to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit." The
1909 law thus provides an "outright exemption" for such nonprofit uses of copyrighted mate-
rials, HousE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAW
RnvrsIoN to accompany H.R. 2512 (March 8, 1967) at 26; SEN. CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
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the time is long past for copyright to drop its irrelevant pretensions. One of these
irrelevant pretensions is the continuous failure to recognize the constitutional
dimension of fair use and to accord it the resultant appropriate legal status. It is
encouraging, however, that some of the leading scholars have come to recognize
the "emerging constitutional limitation on copyright contained in the first amend-
ment.",'
07
None can guarantee that such belated recognition will, of itself, save the
copyright system, but it could conceivably go a long way toward coping with one
of the most serious strains which now undermine the copyright concept. One
thing is reasonably sure: Failure to accord such recognition promptly enough to
prevent irreversible decay could render the copyright system permanently un-
fruitful and irrelevant for noncommercial educational, scholarly, and research
uses.
VII. Conclusion
Fair use in copyright has constitutional protection under the first and ninth
amendments and can assure the public of reasonable access to its heritage, not-
withstanding the purported exclusive right of the copyright proprietor under
statute. Such constitutionally protected fair use has priority over the mere stat-
utory privilege accorded to the copyright owner by the permissive and non-
mandatory action of the Congress in enacting copyright legislation under the
copyright clause.
In the balancing between the constitutional right of access through fair use
and the copyright law, the balance must tilt toward the constitutionally protected
right to reasonable access. Fair use is the vehicle for effectuating this constitu-
tional protection for the primacy of the public interest over the interest of the
copyright proprietor.
Since copyright conveys only a statutory privilege while fair use enjoys
constitutional protection, the burden of proof must shift from the alleged infringer
to the alleger of infringement.
The copyright system is in danger of collapse because of its growing irree-
vance to modem technological and social developments affecting intellectual
creativity, especially in connection with the reasonable use of copyrighted ma-
terials for nonprofit and noncommercial education, research, and scholarship.
Either a new concept or a separate system for such nonprofit uses must arise and
it may or may not be copyright.
Prompt and practical recognition of the constitutional status of fair use
as a means of assuring the publics access to copyright materials (especially for
nonprofit and noncommercial education, research, and scholarship) may help
to turn the tide against the growing obsolescence and irrelevance of the copyright
system for large areas of intellectual creativity, productivity, and use.
93rd Cong. 2d Sess., REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, to accompany S. 1361 (July 3,
1974) at 112.
An Ad Hoc Committee (of Educational Institutions and Organizations) on Copyright Law
Revision proposed a limited educational exemption (to include restricted copying) for non-
profit educational purposes, as a reasonable means of retention and effectuation of the "not-
for-profit" concept of the current law. See Hearings, supra note 7 at 120, 129.
107 Nimmer, supra note 35, at 1200. See also 1 M. NimmER, COPYRIGHT § 9.2 (1974).
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